

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00457 01 OF 04 290926Z

20

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

----- 025415

P R 290808Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0692

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0457

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POLISH AND LUXEMBOURG
PRESENTATIONS AT NOVEMBER 28 PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 28 PLENARY MEETING
OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY
THE POLISH REP (STRULAK) AND BY THE LUXEMBOURG REP
(WINTER). THE LUXEMBOURG STATEMENT, APPROVED AT THE
NOV 22 AD HOC GROUP MEETING, WAS A PRESENTATION ON THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00457 01 OF 04 290926Z

COMMON CEILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA EXCHANGE. THE TEXT

IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM. THE POLISH STATEMENT CONTAINED A DETAILED REJOINDER TO THE NOV 14 WESTERN CRITIQUE OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. STRULAK'S STATEMENT ALSO CRITICIZED ALLIED PHASING AND LINKAGE PROPOSALS, ARGUING THAT THE WEST HAD IN FACT OFFERED NO COMPROMISE SUGGESTIONS, WHILE EVEN THE ALLIES ACKNOWLEDGED ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE IN THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. STRULAK CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE FLOWING FROM "IMPORTANT RECENT EVENTS" TO MAKE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS STRENGTHENING DETENTE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE NOV 26 EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A MANPOWER FREEZE. END SUMMARY.

2. THE TEXT OF THE POLISH STATEMENT, AT THE NOV 28
PLENARY MEETING, READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

MR CHAIRMAN,

1. ALMOST A MONTH HAS PASSED SINCE THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AMBASSADOR LEG KHLESTOV PRESENTED HERE, ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND, THE PROPOSAL FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975. OUR PRINCIPAL MOTIVE BEHIND THIS PROPOSAL WAS TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AGREEMENT ON THE INITIATION OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THUS MOVE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. WE PRESUMED THERE WAS A COMMON FEELING AROUND THIS TABLE FOR THE NEED OF PROGRESS AT THE CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS. OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES HAD SPOKEN ABOUT SUCH NEED AND REFERRED TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION.

2. GIVEN THIS PRESUMPTION AND HAVING MADE AN EFFORT TO ELABORATE A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, DRAWING FROM THE ELEMENTS OF THE TWO RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, WE EXPECTED TO START A SERIOUS, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00457 01 OF 04 290926Z

PURPOSEFUL DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD LEAD US TO UNDERSTANDING.

3. AFTER LISTENING WITH ATTENTION AND DUE CARE TO OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES' COMMENTS ON OUR PROPOSAL, WE REGRET TO NOTE THAT THIS HAS BEEN A HASTILY NEGATIVE RESPONSE.

4. THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL, AS EXPLAINED BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM,

AMBASSADOR ADRIAENSSEN, HAS BEEN EVIDENTLY STRUCTURED WITH THE INTENTION TO SAY NO, NOT TO PROBE AND SEE WHETHER, WHERE AND HOW AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

5. WE WERE PRESENTED WITH A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS MEANT TO JUSTIFY THE NEGATIVE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO OUR PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE FIND THESE ARGUMENTS TO BE EITHER NOT TRUE OR OVEREXTENDED. THEY EXTEND BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF A PURPOSEFUL CONSIDERATION OF AN INDEPENDENT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON INITIAL REDUCTIONS.

6. ON SUBSTANCE THE WESTERN CRITICISM OF OUR PROPOSAL, IN FACT, CONVEYS ALL THE PRINCIPAL POSTULATES OF THE WESTERN "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS" PRESENTED HERE OVER A YEAR AGO, ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973. THERE IS THE DEMAND OF ASYMMETRY, THAT OF RESTRICTING REDUCTION TO GROUND FORCES AND THAT OF CONSIDERABLE AND, PERHAPS, INDEFINITE DELAY IN CONCRETE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS BY SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, UNTIL AFTER SUBSTANTIAL AND LARGELY UNILATERAL SOVIET REDUCTION. IN FACT, THE WESTERN SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO CONVERT THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS STEP INTO SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME. THIS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE SUGGESTION. IT IS, INDEED, STRANGE THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT AFTER WE HAVE CLEARLY EXPLAINED WHAT IS OUR ATTITUDE TO THE WESTERN "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS", THEIR FIRST PHASE INCLUDED. IT IS MORE SO BECAUSE THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

7. FROM THE METHODOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, WHEREAS WE - REALISTICALLY JUDGING THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY PROGRESS - HAVE SUGGESTED TO CONCENTRATE DISCUSSION ON A LIMITED SUBJECT OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS, OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES PROPOSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00457 01 OF 04 290926Z

TO INVOLVE IN IT THE RESPECTIVE GENERAL APPROACHES OF THE PARTIES, EVEN THOUGH ONE YEAR OF DEBATES HAS PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED THAT NO BRIDING OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM IS ANYWHERE NEAR IN SIGHT AND EVIDENTLY THERE REMAINS A LOT TO BE DONE BEFORE WE CAN BRIDGE THIS GAP.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00457 02 OF 04 290932Z

20

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

----- 025462

P R 290808Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0693

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0457

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

8. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FULLY MAINTAIN THEIR REALISTIC, COMPREHENSIVE AND EQUITABLE APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS EXPRESSED IN THE FOUR-POWER DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973. LET US REPEAT AGAIN THAT THE DRAFT FULLY CONFORMS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTIES, TO THE AGREED SUBJECT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND TO THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY, SECURITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00457 02 OF 04 290932Z

9. IT IS A MATTER OF CONTINUING REGRET THAT SUCH AN APPROACH HAS NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND THAT THEIR ATTITUDE IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THESE

ELEMENTS OF COMMON AGREEMENT. THEY CONTINUE DEMANDS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO THROUGH THE AVOWED OBJECTIVE OF ALTERING THE PRESENT STABLE CORRELATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THEIR FAVOUR. OF COURSE, SUCH A PROPOSITION IS NOT REALISTIC.

10. IT WAS THE EVIDENT IMPOSSIBILITY OF OVERCOMING THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, CAUSED BY THE WESTERN INSISTENCE ON A SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS UNILATERALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE NATO, WHICH PROMPTED THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS TO SEPARATE THE ISSUE OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE COMPLEX SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO LOOK FOR A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE IN THE LARGER AND COMMON INTEREST OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. THE COMPROMISE ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSAL ON INITIAL REDUCTION STEP HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, ALTHOUGH RELUCTANTLY AND WITH A CLEAR TENDENCY TO MINIMIZE THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE CHARACTER. SEVERAL POINTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, THOSE CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION IN FIRST REDUCTIONS, THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS, THE RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF REDUCTION AND THE PHASING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEMENTS AND REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE VERY NATURE OF A COMPROMISE DEMANDS THAT ATTITUDES OF BOTH SIDES ARE PARTLY REFLECTED IN IT. THIS IS WHAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE. HOWEVER, IT IS QUITE NATURAL THAT A COMPROMISE CANNOT MEAN A TOTAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE OPPOSITE POSITION. OTHERWISE IT IS NOT A COMPROMISE BUT A SURRENDER.

12. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE GENERAL REMARKS PERMIT ME NOW TO SCRUTINIZE SOME POINTS OF OUR PROPOSAL WHICH HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED BY OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES.

13. TO BEGIN WITH, IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS PROPOSAL DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE SO-CALLED DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES BECAUSE SUCH ALLEGED DISPARITY HAS NEVER BEEN RECOGNIZED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00457 02 OF 04 290932Z

BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AS A VALID PREMISE FOR THE REDUCTION PLANS. ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN CONVINCINGLY REFUTED. IN PARTICULAR WE HAVE ALWAYS STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF MILITARY POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION. BUT, THIS ARGUMENT APART, IT IS NOT TURE TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL,

ONCE ACCEPTED, WILL SERVE AS A MODEL FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS. IT IS CLEARLY STATED IN THE PROPOSAL THAT THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP WILL NOT BECOME A PRECEDENT FOR LATER REDUCTIONS, NEITHER WILL IT PREJUDICE THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF ANY OF THE PARTIES ON THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE PRESUMED THAT SUCH A PROVISION WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND IT IS, TOO, A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. NEXT, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS SPEAK ABOUT THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL FIRST REDUCTIONS BUT WHAT THEY, IN FACT, HAVE IN MIND IS SUCH REDUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET TROOPS, NOT BY THEIR OWN SIDE.

15. IT IS A MATTER OF RECORD THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE INTERESTED IN SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE PRODUCED THE PLAN FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS. WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO BE SATISFIED WITH INITIAL REDUCTIONS ALONE. IN FACT, WE HAVE SUGGESTED AN IMMEDIATE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO AGREE ON MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. UNDER THE PRESENT INITIATIVE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE PROPOSED THE REDUCTION OF 20 THOUSAND SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE HAVING IN MIND A STEP THAT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ANYONE'S SECURITY AND YET WOULD HELP US IN THE FIRST PRACTICAL SOLUTION AS WELL AS IN STRENGTHENING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND WHY OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES SHOULD BE AFRAID OF SUCH MEASURE FOR IMPROVING THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00457 02 OF 04 290932Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00457 03 OF 04 290944Z

20

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

----- 025561

P R 290808Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0694

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0457

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

16. WE ARE ALSO ASTONISHED AT THE WESTERN RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF WHAT THEY THEMSELVES CALL NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS BUT WHAT, INFACT, IS THE LOGICAL REQUIREMENT THAT, ONCE A COUNTRY UNDERTAKES THE COMMITMENT TO REDUCE ITS ARMED FORCES, IT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY INCREASE THEM. WE DO NOT SEE HOW OTHERWISE COULD OUR PROPOSAL OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANY REDUCTION PROPOSAL BE MEANINGFUL. THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE VEHEMENCE OF THE WESTERN CRITICISM ON THIS POINT BIDS US ASK THE QUESTION: IS ANY OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ACTUALLY CONTEMPLATING AN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00457 03 OF 04 290944Z

INCREASE OF ITS ARMED FORCES UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF GROWING EUROPEAN DETENTE? IF NOT, WHY ALL THE OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS?

17 IT IS ALSO SURPRISING, PARTICULARLY FOR MY DELEGATION, WHICH HAS CONTINUOUSLY BEEN POINTING TO THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES AND AIR FORCES INTO A MEANINGFUL REDUCTION AGREEMENT, TO HEAR NOW, FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM, A SUMMARY CONTENTION THAT SUCH INCLUSION IS UNREALISTIC. YET, IT IS REALISM AS WELL AS THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE PRE-

PARATORY CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT ABSOLUTELY CALL FOR COVERING ALL THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITY ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, NOT THE GROUND FORCES ALONE.

18. ONE POINT MORE. THE CATEGORICAL WAY IN WHICH THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONNECT THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS THEY UNILATERALLY FORMULATE IT, INDEED SOUNDS LIKE A CONDITIO SINE QUA NON. ONE MAY ASK: WHAT ENTITLES THE WESTERN SIDE TO PUT SUCH A PRELIMINARY CONDITION? THERE IS CERTAINLY NO BASIS FOR IT IN THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY OBJECTIVE WE HAVE ALL AGREED TO, AND BY WHICH WE STAND, IS MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LEADING TO MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP, STRENGTHENED SECURITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE.

19. REFERENCE TO THE CONTROVERSIAL AND UNACCEPTABLE WESTERN FORMULATION OF THE GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS - THAT OF AN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES - CAN ONLY AIM AT HINDERING AGREEMENT.

20. FINALLY, LET US LOOK AT THE QUESTION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN MAINLY CONSIDERING FOR SOME TIME NOW: WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET? CLEARLY, THE PROPOSAL ON INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROVIDES A COMPROMISE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCING FIRST. THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD START REDUCING ONLY WHEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE COMPLETED THEIR REDUCTIONS. TO MAKE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00457 03 OF 04 290944Z

THEIR PROPOSAL MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MADE THE EFFORT TO ADJUST IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INITIAL STEP THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ACTUALLY REDUCING THEIR TROOPS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND CONTINUE TO DO SO SIMULTANEOUSLY.

21. IT SEEMS THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD THUS BE SATISFIED THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE WHAT THEY HAVE CALLED THE GUARANTEE IN THE FORM OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS BEFORE THEY THEMSELVES START REDUCING.

22. BUT, EVIDENTLY, THEY ARE NOT. THEY SEEM TO HAVE OVERLOOKED THE IMPORTANT CHANGE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' POSITION MADE TO MEET THEIR VIEWS, AS SOMETHING THAT ALMOST HAS NOT HAPPENED. AND THEY DEMAND MORE. THEY PRACTICALLY REQUEST THAT WE TOTALLY ACCEPT THEIR POSITION ON THIS POINT, I.E. THAT WE AGREE TO ONLY SOVIET AND AMERICAN

REDUCTIONS AND FREE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
FROM ANY CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS, AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL
YEARS. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A DEMAND? HOW DO
WE GET OUR GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL REDUCE THEIR ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS? WE DO NOT SEE WHY IT IS NOT
POSSIBLE TO SPEAK ABOUT SUCH REDUCTIONS UNDER THE INITIAL
STEP PROPOSAL IN CONCRETE TERMS WHEN SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS
HAVE NOW PROPOSED THAT THEY TAKE PLACE FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION
OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS. THE POSITION OF
SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ONLY GIVES RISE TO SUSPICION
ABOUT THEIR REAL INTENTIONS. IT IS CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY WHICH CALLS FOR
EQUAL OBLIGATIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

23. WHILE, CONTRARY TO THE TRUTH, OUR PROPOSAL IS BEING
DENIED THE COMPROMISE NATURE, THE SO-CALLED MODIFICATIONS
OF THE WESTERN PLAN OF REDUCTIONS ARE PORTRAYED AS A MAJOR
STEP TOWARDS THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS' STAND WITH REGARD
TO THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION: WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE
REDUCED FROM THE BEGINNING? IT IS ASSERTED THAT THEY AMOUNT
TO A COMPROMISE FORMULA PERMITTING PROGRESS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00457 03 OF 04 290944Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00457 04 OF 04 291004Z

12

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /085 W

----- 025736

P R 290808Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0695
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0457

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

24. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CLOSE ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN POSITION DOES NOT ALLOW TO VIEW THESE SO-CALLED MODIFICATIONS AS ANYTHING BUT AN ELABORATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE BASIC SCHEME OF THE TWO-PHASED REDUCTIONS SUBMITTED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973.

25. FIRSTLY, THE WESTERN SIDE SUBMITS THAT IT HAS MODIFIED ITS ORIGINAL ATTITUDE BECAUSE IT IS NOW PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN THE FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT A DECLARATION OF READINESS BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00457 04 OF 04 291004Z

CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. HOWEVER, THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES' MANPOWER WITHIN THE AREA, AND A SATISFACTORY /READ/ ASYMMETRICAL/ PRIOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS OF ANY OF THE SIX WESTERN STATES ARE NOT SPECIFIED. CONTRARY TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY, THE ORIGINALLY PROPOSED INEQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS REMAINS. THIS IS HARDLY A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

26. SECONDLY, WE HEAR THE ARGUMENT THAT THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS CLARIFIED THE MATTER OF THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS, IN PARTICULAR BY THE NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

27. BUT, IN REALITY NO ACTUAL SCALE OF REDUCTIONS HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN SIDE. WHATEVER DETAILS IT GAVE, THEY ONLY FILLED THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ORIGINAL AND UNREALISTIC SCHEME OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES. IT DID

NOT CHANGE THIS SCHEME.

28. TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, NO NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN RELATION TO THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA, EXCEPT FOR THE US TROOPS. THE VAGUE ASSURANCES THAT THE REDUCTIONS OF THE SECOND PHASE WILL FOCUS ON FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE USA DO NOT PROVIDE THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT WILL BE THE ACTUAL SIZE OF REDUCTIONS BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

29. THIS IS, IN FACT, WHAT THE FOUR SOCIALIST POWERS - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE INTERESTED TO KNOW, JUST AS THEY OFFER TO SPECIFY THEIR PART IN THE REDUCTIONS. WE WONDER WHERE ONE FINDS HERE ANY CLOSENESS TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' POSITION AND WHERE IS A COMPROMISE ELEMENT IN THIS ASPECT OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

30. THIRDLY, IT IS BEING SAID THAT THERE HAVE BEEN COMPROMISE MODIFICATIONS OF THE WESTERN STAND ON THE TIMING OF REDUCTIONS. BUT WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IN THIS RESPECT ONLY MAKES IT MORE EXPLICIT THAT THE SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WANT TO DELAY THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00457 04 OF 04 291004Z

REDUCION PROCESS FOR A FEW YEARS. THE SUGGESTED POSSIBLE TIME FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS THUS CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN THE COMPLETE PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS SUGGESTED IN THE FOUR-POWER DRAFT AGREEMENT. NOWHERE IS THE TIMING OF REDUCTIONS BY NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SPECIFIED. WHERE IS THEN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE POSITION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO BE SEEN HERE?

31. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN NONE OF THE ANALYSED MODIFIATIONS CAN ONE DISCERN THE PROXIMITY TO SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS' STAND. THEREFORE THESE MODIFICATIONS CANNOT BE CALLED COMPROMISE SUGGESTIONS. THEY BOIL DOWN TO THE ELABORATION OF THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PLAN, NOT TO ITS ESSENTIAL ALTERATION.

32. WHEN APPLIED TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE MODIFICATIONS UNMISTAKABLY INDICATE THE SAME ANSWER THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN PROPOSING SINCE THE BEGINNING: ONLY SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. NO ADEQUATE UNDERTAKINGS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE SPELLED OUT.

33. THUS, WE ARE COMPELLED T MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE SO FAR TRACED NO ELEMENT OF A TRUE COMPROMISE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE OFFERED A TRULY BALANCED PROPOSAL AND EVEN OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES COULD NOT DENY THE ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE IN IT.

34. WE DO NOT SAY THIS IN ORDER TO SHOW A "BETTER THAN YOU" ATTITUDE. WE WISH TO REPEAT THAT WE DO NOT ADVANCE OUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE SAKE OF POLEMICS. WE SAY IT IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE OUR EARNEST DESIRE TO ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. WE WISH ONCE AGAIN TO INVITE OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION AIMED AT ACHIEVING SUCH SOLUTION. WE ARE READY TO LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO ANY CONSTRUCTIVE IDEA THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD SUGGEST TO US, WHICH WOULD CONVEY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BUILD AGREEMENT UPON OUR PROPOSAL.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00457 04 OF 04 291004Z

35. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION, PERMIT ME TO REFER TO THE WIDER IMPORTANCE WHICH OUR TALKS HAVE IN GENERAL EFFORTS TOWARDS STRENGTHENING DETENTE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE. NO DOUBT, THERE ARE IMPORTANT RECENT EVENTS THAT AUGUR WELL FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THESE POSITIVE PROCESSES. WE MAY AVAIL OURSELVES OF THIS ATMOSPHERE IN ORDER TO MAKE OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION, HOWEVER MODEST IT MAY INITIAL BE.

36. AS FAR AS THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THEY WILL NOT CEASE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN VIENNA. THEY WILL EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE WHERE ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT CAN BE FOUND AND OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS RESPECTED.
END TEXT. RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00457
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740346-0517
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t1974113/aaaaachs.tel
Line Count: 635
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: POLISH AND LUXEMBOURG PRESENTATIONS AT NOVEMBER 28 PLENARY SESSION
TAGS: PARM, PL, LU, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005